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RECENT CASE 
DIRECTV, INC. V. IMBURGIA 
Supreme Court Holds California Court’s Interpretation 
Preempted by Federal Arbitration Act 
Angelica Sanchez Vega∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
It is no secret that alternative dispute resolution (ADR) has become an 
important part of the contemporary American legal system.  Compared to 
full-fledged judicial proceedings, ADR methods, including arbitration, 
offer a more cost-effective alternative.  Both private and public entities 
have embraced the chance to address legal disputes while using resources 
more effectively.  In 1998, for example, President Clinton issued a 
memorandum to the heads of executive departments and agencies 
encouraging the use of ADR “[a]s part of an effort to make the Federal 
Government operate in a more efficient and effective manner.”1  In spite of 
all of the benefits of ADR, concerns about the innate fairness of these 
methods of dispute resolution still abound.  Nowhere are such concerns 
more evident than in the context of arbitration agreements between large, 
sophisticated entities and individual consumers. 
Despite concerns as to the implicit fairness of ADR, the enforcement 
of arbitration agreements in American courts has been markedly 
strengthened by one important piece of legislation: the Federal Arbitration 
Act (FAA).2  The FAA was proclaimed as “[a]n Act [t]o make valid and 
enforceable written provisions or agreements for arbitration of disputes 
arising out of contracts, maritime transactions, or commerce among the 
 
 ∗  Candidate for Juris Doctor, University of Notre Dame Law School, 2017; M.B.A., 
Bellarmine University, 2013; B.A., Bellarmine University, 2009. 
 1  Memorandum from President Clinton to the Heads of Executive Departments and 
Agencies (May 1, 1998), 
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olp/docs/1998.05.01CLINTON.pdf. 
 2  Pub. L. No. 68-401, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codified as amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–15 
(2012)). 
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States or Territories or with foreign nations.”3  This single piece of 
legislation has been the subject of a number of Supreme Court cases, 
including the important Southland Corp. v. Keating4 decision.  In 
Southland, the Supreme Court held that the FAA applies in state courts and 
preempts conflicting state law.5  On December 14, 2015, the Supreme 
Court added an additional chapter to the history of the FAA through its 
decision in DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia.6  The Supreme Court in DIRECTV 
held that California law making arbitration waivers unenforceable is 
preempted by the FAA.7 
I.     BACKGROUND 
At issue in DIRECTV were sections 9 and 10 of DIRECTV’s service 
agreement.  Section 9 of the agreement provided that any claim would be 
resolved only by binding arbitration8 and stated that “if ‘the law of your 
state’ made the waiver of class arbitration unenforceable, then the entire 
arbitration provision” would be unenforceable.9  Section 10 provided that 
the FAA governs section 9 of the agreement.10  
Section 9 was of particular relevance in the state of California.  In 
2005, the California Supreme Court decided Discover Bank v. Superior 
Court,11 holding that waivers of class arbitration in consumer adhesion 
contracts were unconscionable, and thus not enforceable.12  This holding 
was eventually dubbed California’s “Discover Bank rule.”13  It was within 
this legal context that, in 2008, Amy Imburgia and Kathy Greiner 
commenced a lawsuit in California state court against DIRECTV.14  About 
three years of litigation ensued, but then in 2011 the United States Supreme 
Court issued its opinion in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion.15 
Concepcion held that the FAA preempted California’s Discover Bank 
rule.16  Given the development produced by Concepcion, DIRECTV asked 
 
 3  Federal Arbitration Act, 43 Stat. at 883.  
 4  465 U.S. 1 (1984). 
 5  Id. at 16–17. 
 6  136 S. Ct. 463 (2015). 
 7  Id. at 471. 
 8  Id. at 466 (citing Joint Appendix at 128, DIRECTV, 136 S. Ct. 463 (No. 14-462)). 
 9  Id. (quoting Joint Appendix, supra note 8, at 129). 
 10  Id. (citing Joint Appendix, supra note 8, at 129). 
 11  113 P.3d 1100 (Cal. 2005), abrogated by AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 
U.S. 333 (2011). 
 12  Id. at 1103, 1108. 
 13  Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 340. 
 14  DIRECTV, 136 S. Ct. at 466.  Imburgia and Greiner sought damages for early 
termination fees that they alleged violated California law.  Id. 
 15  563 U.S. 333 (2011). 
 16  Id. at 352. 
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the trial court to send the matter to arbitration pursuant to section 9 of the 
service agreement.17  The trial court, however, denied DIRECTV’s request, 
and the company appealed.18  The California Court of Appeal affirmed the 
trial court’s decision, noting that under California law as existing when 
DIRECTV drafted the agreement, such prohibition on class arbitration was 
unenforceable.19  Furthermore, the court of appeal found that while 
Concepcion invalidated California’s rule, the FAA gives the parties the 
freedom to choose governing law irrespective of federal preemption.20  To 
support its conclusion, the court of appeal set forth two reasons: (1) the 
provision stating that the FAA governed was a general provision of the 
service agreement, while the provision voiding arbitration if the “law of 
your state” found a class arbitration waive unenforceable was a specific 
provision; and (2) the common law rule that ambiguous language in a 
contract should be construed against the drafter of the contract.21  The 
California Supreme Court denied discretionary review and DIRECTV filed 
a petition for a writ of certiorari, which was granted.22 
II.     ANALYSIS 
Justice Breyer delivered the opinion for the majority.  The majority 
framed the issue as “not whether [the California Court of Appeal’s] 
decision is a correct statement of California law but whether (assuming it 
is) that state law is consistent with the Federal Arbitration Act.”23  In 
particular, as the majority explained, the issue was whether the California 
Court of Appeal’s decision rested upon “grounds as exist at law or in equity 
for the revocation of any contract” as prescribed by the FAA.24  The 
majority’s opinion answered this question in the negative. 
According to the majority, the California Court of Appeal interpreted 
the language “law of your state” to include invalid state law.25  Such 
interpretation was deemed unacceptable by the Court because it precludes 
arbitration contracts from standing on equal footing with other types of 
contracts.26  In support of its conclusion, the majority outlined six reasons.  
 
 17  DIRECTV, 136 S. Ct. at 466. 
 18  Id. 
 19  Id. at 467 (citing Imburgia v. DIRECTV, Inc., 170 Cal. Rptr. 3d 190, 194 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2014), rev’d, 136 S. Ct. 463 (2015)).  
 20  Id. 
 21  Id. 
 22  Id. at 467–68. 
 23  Id. at 468. 
 24  Id. (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012)). 
 25  Id. at 469.  
 26  Id. (“After examining the grounds upon which the Court of Appeal rested its 
decision, we conclude that California courts would not interpret contracts other than 
arbitration contracts the same way.”). 
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First, contrary to the opinion of the California Court of Appeal, the 
majority found that the contract language was not ambiguous.27  In the 
majority’s view, absent any other indication in the contract, the contract’s 
provision for “the law of your state” is governed by its ordinary meaning: 
valid state law, not including invalid state law.28  Second, California law 
itself clarified how to interpret the language in question.29  Citing Doe v. 
Harris,30 the majority noted that California law incorporates the California 
Legislature’s power to change the law retroactively, and thus the law as 
announced in Harris would govern the scope of the phrase “law of your 
state.”31  Third, from the majority’s perspective, the California Court of 
Appeal’s reasoning did not suggest that it would apply the same reasoning 
in any other context outside of arbitration.32  According to the majority, 
there is 
nothing in [the court of appeal’s] opinion (nor in any other California 
case) suggesting that California would generally interpret words such as 
“law of your state” to include state laws held invalid because they 
conflict with, say, federal labor statutes, federal pension statutes, federal 
antidiscrimination laws, the Equal Protection Clause, or the like.33 
Fourth, the California Court of Appeal’s language focused exclusively 
on arbitration, which suggested to the majority that the court of appeal 
meant to limit its holding to the particular subject matter of arbitration.34  
Fifth, the Court outright rejected the suggestion that state law, in this case 
California’s Discover Bank rule, maintains independent force after prior 
invalidation by a Supreme Court decision.35  Sixth, no additional principle 
was invoked by the court of appeal suggesting that the same interpretation 
of the phrase “law of your state” would be applied by California courts in 
other contexts outside of arbitration.36  While the majority recognized the 
court of appeal’s invocation of the specific exception to the agreement’s 
general adoption of the FAA, such a reading “tells us nothing about how to 
interpret the words ‘law of your state’ elsewhere.”37 
Justice Thomas provided a brief dissent in which he restated his belief 
that the FAA does not apply in state courts, and as such he would affirm 
 
 27  Id. 
 28  Id. 
 29  Id. 
 30  302 P.3d 598, 601–02 (Cal. 2013). 
 31  DIRECTV, 136 S. Ct. at 469. 
 32  Id. 
 33  Id. at 469–70. 
 34  Id. at 470. 
 35  Id. 
 36  Id.  
 37  Id.  
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the decision of the California Court of Appeal.38  The more detailed 
critique of the majority’s opinion was presented by Justice Ginsburg, who, 
joined by Justice Sotomayor, took a more critical view of the FAA’s 
expanding scope.  In her dissent, Justice Ginsburg explained that given the 
precedent on the subject of the FAA, she “would take no further step to 
disarm consumers, leaving them without effective access to justice.”39 
Justice Ginsburg’s dissent focused on the role of DIRECTV as the 
drafter of the agreement, and she considered it “particularly appropriate” to 
interpret any ambiguity against DIRECTV.40  This common law rule of 
interpretation had “particular force” because the California Court of Appeal 
applied it to a standardized contract.41  Furthermore, according to Justice 
Ginsburg, the plaintiffs were unlikely to anticipate in 2007—when they 
entered into the agreement with DIRECTV—the Supreme Court’s 2011 
Concepcion decision invalidating their state’s Discover Bank rule.42  In 
Justice Ginsburg’s view, the interpretation of the contract given by the 
California Court of Appeal was “not only reasonable, [but also] entirely 
right.”43 
As a preliminary matter, Justice Ginsburg framed arbitration as “a 
matter of ‘consent, not coercion.’”44  Accordingly, in Justice Ginsburg’s 
view, “[a]llowing DIRECTV to reap the benefit of an ambiguity it could 
have avoided would ignore not just the hugely unequal bargaining power of 
the parties, but also their reasonable expectations at the time the contract 
was formed.”45  Moreover, Justice Ginsburg noted that historically the 
 
 38  Id. at 471 (Thomas, J., dissenting).  Justice Thomas’s belief that the FAA only 
applies in federal courts, and not in state courts, stems from disagreement with the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Southland.  Justice Thomas’s reasoning on this point was further 
detailed in his dissent in Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, where he stated:  
[N]ot until 1959—nearly 35 years after Congress enacted the FAA—did any court 
suggest that § 2 [of the FAA] applied in state courts. . . . The explanation for this 
delay is simple: The statute that Congress enacted actually applies only in federal 
courts.  At the time of the FAA’s passage in 1925, laws governing the 
enforceability of arbitration agreements were generally thought to deal purely with 
matters of procedure rather than substance, because they were directed solely to 
the mechanisms for resolving the underlying disputes. 
513 U.S. 265, 286 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Robert Lawrence Co. v. 
Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271 F.2d 402, 407 (2d Cir. 1959)). 
 39  DIRECTV, 136 S. Ct. at 471 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  
 40  Id. at 472. 
 41  Id. at 475. 
 42  Id. at 472 (quoting Imburgia v. DIRECTV, Inc., 170 Cal. Rptr. 3d 190, 196 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 2014)). 
 43  Id. at 473. 
 44  Id. (quoting Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 681 
(2010)). 
 45  Id. at 475. 
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Supreme Court has respected state court interpretations’ of arbitration 
agreements.46  Thus, in her view, the DIRECTV decision is “a dangerous 
first.”47 
In order to reach such a radically different conclusion from the 
majority’s opinion, Justice Ginsburg’s dissent reconciled the reasoning of 
the California Court of Appeal with the Court’s decision in Concepcion by 
adopting a narrower reading of Concepcion.  According to Justice 
Ginsburg’s dissent, Concepcion “held only that a State cannot compel a 
party to engage in class arbitration when the controlling agreement 
unconditionally prohibits class procedures.”48  Thus, from Justice 
Ginsburg’s perspective, the majority in DIRECTV oversteps the framework 
laid out in Concepcion.  By overstepping Concepcion’s framework, the 
majority effectively maintains that “it no longer matters whether DIRECTV 
meant California’s ‘home state laws’ when it drafted the 2007 version of its 
service agreement.”49 
Justice Ginsburg also underscored the fact that the FAA allows parties 
to choose governing law.50  Accordingly, for Justice Ginsburg, the 
dispositive question is “whether the parties intended the ‘law of your state’ 
provision to mean state law as preempted by federal law . . . or home state 
law as framed by the California Legislature, without considering the 
preemptive effect of federal law.”51  The latter of these two alternative 
readings is deemed the more adequate reading in Justice Ginsburg’s 
dissent.52 
Justice Ginsburg’s dissent does concede that the FAA has been 
construed as a “federal policy favoring arbitration.”53  However, she 
reminds readers of the limits of FAA application as voiced in the 2010 
Granite Rock Co. v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters54 decision.  In 
Granite Rock, the Supreme Court cautioned that a presumption favoring 
arbitration should apply “only where it reflects, and derives its legitimacy 
from, a judicial conclusion that arbitration of a particular dispute is what 
the parties intended because their express agreement to arbitrate was 
validly formed and . . . is legally enforceable and best construed to 
encompass the dispute.”55  Given the disparity in bargaining power 
 
 46  Id. at 473. 
 47  Id. 
 48  Id. (citing AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 351 (2011)). 
 49  Id.  
 50  Id. 
 51  Id. at 474. 
 52  Id. 
 53  Id. at 475 (quoting Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior 
Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 476 (1989)). 
 54  561 U.S. 287 (2010). 
 55  Id. at 303. 
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between individual consumers and a sophisticated entity such as 
DIRECTV, Justice Ginsburg considers the majority’s opinion not only a 
step beyond Concepcion, but also a misreading of the FAA that effectively 
deprives consumers of relief against entities that write prohibitions on class 
arbitration into their form contracts.56  According to Justice Ginsburg, the 
decision in DIRECTV holds that “consumers lack not only protection 
against unambiguous class-arbitration bans in adhesion contracts.  They 
lack even the benefit of the doubt when anomalous terms . . . could be 
construed to protect their rights.”57 
Justice Ginsburg closes her critique of the majority’s opinion with a 
reminder of the context in which the FAA was originally enacted, 
highlighting that the FAA was meant to enforce arbitration agreements 
between parties of relatively equal bargaining power.58  According to 
Justice Ginsburg, “Congress in 1925 could not have anticipated that the 
Court would apply the FAA to render consumer adhesion contracts 
invulnerable to attack by parties who never meaningfully agreed to 
arbitration in the first place.”59  Moreover, Justice Ginsburg also points to 
section 2 of the FAA—on which the majority relies—and its prescription 
that arbitration provisions ought to be treated like other contractual terms 
with the implication that such terms should not receive any type of 
preferential treatment.60  Justice Ginsburg finally notes the marked 
divergence of DIRECTV’s holding with the way in which mandatory 
arbitration clauses in consumer contracts are treated abroad.61  Citing a 
1993 European Union Directive which forbids binding consumers to unfair 
contractual terms,62 and a subsequent EU Recommendation interpreting the 
Directive,63 Justice Ginsburg underscores how consumer disputes in the 
European Union are arbitrated only when the parties mutually agree on 
arbitration on a “post-dispute basis.”64 
 
 56  DIRECTV, 136 S. Ct. at 476 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 57  Id.  Highlighting that consumers have not always lacked “the benefit of the doubt,” 
Justice Ginsburg references two previous Supreme Court cases, one dating as far back as 
1953.  Id. at 476 n.3 (citing Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 435, 438 (1953); Green Tree Fin. 
Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 90 (2000)). 
 58  Id. at 477 (citing Margaret L. Moses, Arbitration Law: Who’s in Charge?, 40 
SETON HALL L. REV. 147, 170–71 (2010)). 
 59  Id. at 477–78 (citing Judith Resnik, Diffusing Disputes: The Public in the Private of 
Arbitration, the Private in Courts, and the Erasure of Rights, 124 YALE L.J. 2804, 2860 
(2015)). 
 60  Id. at 478. 
 61  Id. 
 62  Council Directive 93/13, art. 3, 1993 O.J. (L 95) 31. 
 63  Commission Recommendation 98/257, 1998 O.J. (L 115) 34. 
 64  Id. at 478 (quoting Jean R. Sternlight, Is the U.S. Out on a Limb?  Comparing the 
U.S. Approach to Mandatory Consumer and Employment Arbitration to That of the Rest of 
the World, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 831, 847–48 (2002)). 
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CONCLUSION 
The majority in DIRECTV anchored its reasoning in the language of 
the FAA itself, and the status of California’s Discover Bank rule vis-à-vis 
federal law.  The outcome was not surprising, particularly for those that 
have followed recent FAA litigation before the Court.  However, DIRECTV 
is significant in at least two aspects: (1) it reflects the Supreme Court’s 
sensitivity to the “different” or more stringent treatment that state courts 
might give arbitration agreements, and (2) it suggests that under the current 
legal landscape consumer advocates’ concerns might be more effectively 
addressed through legislative action rather than through litigation. 
Consumer groups and individual consumers may find the “equal 
footing” reasoning by the majority to be a little ironic.  The Supreme Court 
is forthcoming about ensuring the equal treatment of all contracts (whether 
they are arbitration agreements or not), but contrary to what many 
consumer advocate groups may wish, the majority in DIRECTV does not 
dwell on Justice Ginsburg’s concerns regarding the disparity in bargaining 
power between individual consumers and more sophisticated entities.  As 
caustic to individual consumer rights as such rationale may appear, it is 
difficult to fault the majority for deeming the language used by DIRECTV 
to be unambiguous, and applying the ordinary meaning of the phrase “law 
of your state.”  The reasoning used by the California Court of Appeal 
which interpreted “law of your state” to include invalid state law proved 
simply too odd of an argument for the Supreme Court to accept.  After all, 
to hold that the California Court of Appeal reasonably read the phrase 
would have required the Supreme Court to dilute the force of its previous 
Concepcion decision, which struck down California’s Discover Bank rule.  
Such a retreat would have undoubtedly opened the door to additional 
questions about the independent force of other state laws previously 
considered preempted by other Supreme Court decisions. 
Regardless of whether or not the holding of DIRECTV truly makes 
consumer form contracts with prohibitions on class arbitration completely 
invulnerable to attack, as described in Justice Ginsburg’s dissent, the 
outcome of DIRECTV should serve as a demarcation, a sort of tipping 
point, for consumer advocate groups.  Justice Ginsburg’s dissent echoes 
several of the practical concerns related to the asymmetric bargaining 
positions between individual consumers and companies that prohibit class 
arbitration in form contracts, and raises important questions about the 
legislative intent of the FAA.  However, as time passes and the use of 
arbitration becomes more commonplace, it also becomes more difficult to 
ignore its attractive qualities—chiefly its time and cost efficiencies.  
Nonetheless, after DIRECTV, it should be rather clear that any desired 
rebalancing of bargaining power between individual consumers and 
sophisticated entities will not be effectuated through the courts, at least not 
any time soon.  Instead, DIRECTV calls for consumer advocacy groups to 
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more aggressively focus their efforts on persuading the legislature to make 
any desired changes.  Of course, legislative efforts would require a higher 
degree of concerted organization, and such efforts will likely face strong 
opposition from the entities who will continue to seek the benefits of cost-
effective, legally enforceable methods of dispute resolution. 
 
 
